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ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
Pamela Glazner*
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year California courts chip away at the jagged
edges of legal ethics questions while simultaneously creating
other bulges in this area of law. The ethics year in 2005 was
no different. Courts issued opinions relating to attorney fees,'
conflicts of interest,2 the attorney-client privilege,3 missed
deadlines,4 the scope of attorneys' implicit authority, and
legal malpractice and ineffective assistance of counsel.6 The
California Supreme Court also addressed misconduct in death
penalty cases,7  and prosecutors' religious and biblical
arguments fractured a court that is almost always unanimous
in such cases.' Additionally, in a rare instance, the supreme
court issued a full-length opinion disbarring an attorney who
had been disbarred once before.9 Finally, for the third time in
as many years, a proposed government whistleblower
exception to the duty of confidentiality began its march
through the Assembly. 10 All of these items contributed to yet
another year of defining legal ethics moments and
* Ethics Editor and Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 46; J.D.
Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., English and
Communications, University of Denver. Special thanks to Professor Alan
Scheflin for sharing his unmatched ethics knowledge during the development of
this piece.
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See infra Part VII.
5. See infra Part VIII.
6. See infra Part IX.
7. See infra Part X.
8. See infra Part X.A. In 2005, the Court was unanimous in twenty-six of
twenty-nine death penalty cases. See infra Part X.
9. See infra Part XI.
10. See infra Part VI.
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highlighted emerging battles.
II. ATTORNEY FEES AND RELATED TOPICS
The issue of attorney fees and related topics received
more attention than any other ethics issue the California
courts of appeal faced in 2005.1 Attorney fee contract
provisions, particularly those regarding the reciprocity
requirement contained in Civil Code section 1717(a), faced
appellate review in three cases.12 The courts of appeal also
dealt with attorney fees and their intersection with conflict of
interest,13 conspiracy, 4 and arbitration.' 5  Additionally, the
State Bar issued an opinion addressing the commingling of
attorney fees.'
A. Attorney Fee Contract Provisions
i. Reciprocity
Issues involving Civil Code section 1717(a)'s reciprocity
mandate, which requires that attorney fee contract provisions
apply to both parties to the contract, were prevalent in 2005.
In Baldwin Builders v. Coast Plastering Corp.,1" the Fourth
District Court of Appeal determined that indemnity contract
provisions awarding attorney fees for enforcing the
agreement are reciprocal.'" In Baldwin, a contract between a
general contractor and two subcontractors contained an
indemnity clause requiring the subcontractors to indemnify
the general contractor against any claim related to the
subcontractors' work and to defend against any claim at the
11. Baldwin Builders v. Coast Plastering Corp., 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 9 (Ct. App.
2005); ABF Capital Corp. v. Grove Props. Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803 (Ct. App.
2005); Paul v. Schoellkopf, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 766 (Ct. App. 2005); Anderson,
McPharlin & Connors v. Yee, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627 (Ct. App. 2005); Sullivan v.
Dorsa, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547 (Ct. App. 2005); Berg & Berg Enters. v. Sherwood
Partners, Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325 (Ct. App. 2005); Law Offices of Dixon R.
Howell v. Valley, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (Ct. App. 2005).
12. Baldwin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 9; ABF, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803; Paul, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 766.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. See infra Part II.E.
17. Baldwin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 9.
18. Id. at 10-11.
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subcontractors' expense.1 9 The contract also provided that the
subcontractors would pay any costs and attorney fees
incurred as a result of enforcing the indemnification
agreement. 20  The contract contained language suggesting
that only the subcontractors, and not the general contractor,
would have to pay these costs and attorney fees.2'
When the subcontractors refused to defend a suit against
the general contractor at their own expense, the general
contractor sought to enforce the indemnity agreement.22 The
jury specifically found the general contractor but not the
subcontractors liable. The subcontractors then filed motions
to recover the costs and attorney fees incurred in defending
against the general contractor's claim against them.2"
The appellate court interpreted California Civil Code
section 1717(a) to require reciprocity of costs and attorney
fees that were incurred to enforce the indemnification
agreement, despite the unilateral language of the contract.24
The court reasoned that the statute was limited to these
"'action[s] on a contract . . . [and] incurred to enforce that
contract,' 2' and did not include costs and fees incurred as an
"element of loss within the scope of the indemnity."26
However, the appellate court concluded that an award of the
non-statutory costs and attorney's fees was appropriate,
including those the subcontractors incurred in proving that
they lacked liability because they had to do so in order to
prevail under the indemnity agreement.
19. Id. at 11.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Baldwin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 11.
24. Id. at 12. California Civil Code section 1717(a) provides:
In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides
that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that
contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the
prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party
prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in
the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in
addition to other costs.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717(a) (2005).
25. Baldwin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 12.
26. Id. at 13.
27. Id. at 14, 16. The appellate court reversed, however, as to the actual
amount encompassed by the proper statement of available recovery, and it
remanded to the trial court for a determination of the correct dollar amount. Id.
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Extending the reciprocity requirement, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal determined that California's
reciprocity requirement for attorney fee provisions also
applies to contracts containing clear choice-of-law
provisions.28 In ABF Capital Corp. v. Grove Properties Co.,
the contract at issue contained a choice-of-law provision
designating New York law as controlling, as well as a
unilateral attorney fee provision requiring defendants to pay
plaintiffs attorney fees in enforcing the contract.29 When
defendants allegedly failed to perform under the contract,
plaintiff sued. °
The appellate court ruled that California law regarding
the reciprocity of attorney fees in enforcing a contract applied
in this case.3 1 It determined that although the choice-of-law
provision was otherwise valid,32 New York's law concerning
the specific issue of reciprocity of attorney fee contract
provisions was contrary to California's fundamental policy in
favor of reciprocity.3 3 While New York law does not have the
requirement that attorney fee contract provisions be
reciprocal, California's Civil Code section 1717(a) requiring
reciprocity 'represents a basic and fundamental policy choice
by the state of California.' 34  The reciprocity requirement
"reflects a general policy to prevent one-sided attorney fee
provisions. Thus, it promotes certainty, and prevents
overreaching both in negotiation of a contract and in the use
of the courts during litigation."35  The court rejected the
plaintiffs contention that this policy consideration did not
apply to business entities who would receive the benefit of the
reciprocity. 6 With this conflict of law, the court found that
California had a materially greater interest in the
determination of reciprocity of attorney fees contract
provisions than did New York. When litigants use
at 18.
28. ABF Capital Corp. v. Grove Props. Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 815-16 (Ct.
App. 2005).
29. Id. at 805.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 816.
32. Id. at 810.
33. Id. at 810-11.
34. ABF, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 811.
35. Id. at 812.
36. Id. at 811.
37. Id. at 813.
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California courts, California has a greater interest "in seeing
its residents receive fair play with respect to attorney fees...
than New York has in assuring the enforcement of New York
law concerning attorney fees, when those attorney fees are
not incurred as a result of any use of New York courts, and
have no effect on the accessibility to New York courts."
38
Therefore, California law regarding reciprocity of attorney
fees applies despite choice-of-law and unilateral attorney fee
provisions .3
While the Fourth District Court of Appeal extended the
reciprocity requirement to contracts with choice-of-law
clauses selecting other states' laws that do not require
reciprocity, the Second District limited the scope of the
reciprocity requirement. In Paul v. Schoellkopf, the appellate
court found that a provision in a contract between a buyer
and seller of real property that provided for attorney fees for
the escrow company could not be applied to award attorney
fees to either the buyer or the seller.4 ° In Paul, the contract
between a buyer and a seller of real property contained a
provision providing for attorney fees for the escrow company
in the event that the escrow company needed to employ an
attorney to recover its fees or expenses.41 When a contract
dispute developed between the buyer and seller, the trial
court found for the buyer and awarded the buyer attorney
fees.42
The appellate court reversed,43 finding that although a
buyer and seller cannot limit recovery of attorney fees to a
specific type of claim as between the buyer and the seller, the
provision for the escrow company's attorney fees was proper.44
Civil Code section 1717(a) requires that a contract provision
specifically providing for attorney fees for only one party must
apply to whichever party prevails.45 The appellate court
limited Section 1717(a)'s application to disputes between the
38. Id.
39. Id. at 816.
40. Paul v. Schoellkopf, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 767 (Ct. App. 2005).
41. Id. at 768. The appellate court reduced damages in an unpublished part
of the opinion. Id. at 767.
42. Id. at 768.
43. Id. at 771.
44. Id. at 770.
45. Id. at 768-69.
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buyer and seller in this case.46 Since the contract provision
provided for attorney's fees to the escrow company in the
event of dispute between the buyer/seller and the escrow
company, and not a dispute between the buyer and seller, the
trial court could not use that provision to award attorney's
fees to the buyer in its non-escrow-related dispute with the
seller.
ii. Departing Law Firm Partners
Law firm partnership agreements also generated an
attorney fees dispute in 2005. In Anderson, McPharlin &
Connors v. Yee, the Second District Court of Appeal ruled that
an attorney who departed from a law firm had to comply with
a provision of the firm's partnership agreement requiring
departing attorneys to pay the firm an amount equal to
twenty-five percent of the attorney's fees earned on former
clients' cases within two years of departure.48 When a
partner left with firm clients who had twenty-seven open files
and refused to pay the sum, which amounted to $131,685.95
as required by the contract,49 the firm sued for breach of
contract.5 °
The appellate court ruled that California Rule of
Professional Conduct 2-200(A), which provides in relevant
part "that a lawyer 'shall not divide a fee for legal services
with a lawyer who is not [his] partner' unless certain
conditions including written consent of the client are met, did
not apply in this situation. 1 It did not matter that the
departed attorney would be fee-splitting with his former
partner; he was not fee-splitting with a non-partner in
violation of the rule.12 "'Once the client's fee is paid to an
attorney, it is of no concern to the client how that fee is
allocated among the attorney and his or her former
partners.' 53 The appellate court also indicated that it would
rule in favor of the law firm even if Rule 2-200(A) did apply
46. Paul, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 770.
47. Id.
48. Anderson, McPharlin & Connors v. Yee, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627 (Ct. App.
2005).
49. Id. at 629.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 630.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 630 (quoting Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (Ct. App. 1984)).
962 [Vol: 46
ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
because the amount did not actually constitute fees but
rather a measure of the firm's losses. 4
B. Conflict of Interest and Attorney Fees
The issues of conflicts of interest, attorneys' duties, and
recovery of attorney fees appeared together in a single 2005
case. In Sullivan v. Dorsa, the Sixth District Court of Appeal
upheld an award of attorney fees to a law firm, despite a
conflict of interest, that created land sale documents for a
referee appointed to complete the sale of land necessary for a
partition by sale. 5 A group of real property owners filed an
action to partition their property by sale. 6 They agreed to
have a referee appointed to conduct the sale .5  The referee
hired an attorney from the Silicon Valley Law Group
(hereinafter SVLG) to draft documents in connection with the
sale, and the referee then executed a contract to sell the
property to DiNapoli Companies (hereinafter DiNapoli).5"
However, since SVLG had a conflict of interest due to its
"ongoing relationship" with DiNapoli, the referee hired
another law firm to help prepare the sales documents.59
Although the trial court did not confirm the sale to
DiNapoli,6 ° it awarded attorney fees to SVLG on the referee's
motion.61
The owners appealed the award of attorney fees to SVLG
arguing that SVLG should not have been awarded attorney
fees because it had a conflict of interest in violation of
Professional Conduct Rule 3-3 10.62 The court of appeal
rejected this argument. The appellate court first noted that
SVLG was counsel for the referee, not the owners, and
therefore did not owe the same duties to the owners as it did
to the referee.' The appellate court also suggested that the
mere presence of a conflict of interest, in the absence of
54. Anderson, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 630-31.
55. Sullivan v. Dorsa, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547, 561 (Ct. App. 2005).
56. Id. at 549.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 550.
59. Id. at 551.
60. Id. at 552.
61. Sullivan, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 553.
62. Id. at 559.
63. Id. at 561.
64. Id. at 560.
2006] 963
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
"misconduct... so incompatible with the faithful
performance of [a law firm's] duties," is not sufficient to deny
attorney fees.65 Indeed, the court indicated that there must
be "'a serious violation of the attorney's responsibilities before
an attorney who violates an ethical rule is required to forfeit
fees.' 66 The appellate court found that the owners did not
show that "any violation of the rules governing representation
of adverse interests was serious enough to compel a forfeiture
of fees," and upheld SVLG's award.
C. Conspiracy and Attorneys Fees
Civil conspiracy claims against attorneys infrequently
come before courts. 68  When they do, the issue is often not
about the attorney's conduct but rather about whether the
plaintiff has met the statutory requirements.69 One such case
came before the Sixth District Court of Appeal, which
disallowed a plaintiffs claims against an attorney because the
allegations did not fall within the exceptions to Civil Code
section 1714.10, which requires a special procedure for
making civil conspiracy claims against an attorney, and
because plaintiff failed to comply with the procedure.7 ° In
Berg & Berg Enterprises v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., Pluris, a
network router developer, repudiated a contract it had with
Berg & Berg Enterprises, a real estate developer. 71  After
failing to raise enough money to satisfy a settlement with
Berg, Pluris assigned all of its assets to Sherwood Partners,
Inc. for the benefit of its creditors, including Berg.72 The
creditors then tried to force Pluris into involuntary
bankruptcy so that Berg could acquire Pluris, but Sherwood
defeated the creditors' attempt with the aid of Sherwood's law
65. Id.
66. Id. Suggestions of possible serious violations included when the
attorney's "representation involved elements of fraud, unfairness, acts in
violation or excess authority, acts inconsistent with the character of the
profession, or acts incompatible with the faithful discharge of the attorney's
duties." Id.
67. Sullivan, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561.
68. Interview with Alan Scheflin, Professor of Legal Profession, Santa Clara
University School of Law, in Santa Clara, Cal. (Apr. 13, 2006).
69. Id.
70. Berg & Berg Enters. v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325,
350 (Ct. App. 2005).
71. Id. at 329.
72. Id. at 330.
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firm, SulmeyerKupetz (hereinafter Sulmeyer).73 Berg then
brought causes of action against Sherwood pertaining to an
alleged breach of the fiduciary duties that Berg, as Pluris's
largest creditor, claimed Sherwood owed it by virtue of being
the assignee of Pluris's assets.74 Berg then filed a motion to
amend its pleadings to add Sulmeyer as a defendant in three
causes of action and to add a separate claim of conspiracy to
waste corporate assets against Sherwood and Sulmeyer.75
Berg's basis for all four of these claims was that Sulmeyer
conspired with Pluris to deplete Pluris's assets by performing
unnecessary and unreasonable legal services for exorbitant
fees.76 However, in its pleadings, Berg did not allege that
Sulmeyer owed any duty to Berg, nor did it allege that
Sulmeyer engaged in any fraud or obtained any financial gain
outside of fees.77 The trial court dealt with the motion as any
other motion for leave to amend" and did not require
compliance with Section 1714.10, which "requires a plaintiff
who desires to pursue such an action [against an attorney for
conspiracy] to first commence a special proceeding by filing a
verified petition naming the attorney as respondent."79 The
statute further requires that "the plaintiff demonstrate
'pleadability' and some indicia of likelihood of success on the
merits before the respective claims may be pursued-usually
as measured against the standard of a prima facie case."80
Under the statute, after the attorney has an opportunity to
respond, the trial court will either grant the petition and the
plaintiff may file the complaint in the main action, or the trial
court will deny the petition and the plaintiff may not file the
complaint.81
The appellate court first looked at the revisions to
Section 1714.10.82 In response to the California Supreme
Court's interpretation of Section 1714.10,3 the legislature
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Berg, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 331.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 332.
79. Id. at 333.
80. Id. at 334.
81. Id. at 333.
82. Berg, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 335.
83. Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court, 775 P.2d 508 (Cal. 1989).
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amended the statute to include two exceptions where
plaintiffs do not have comply with the special statutory
procedures: "(1) where the attorney violates a duty that he or
she independently owes to the plaintiff, and (2) where the
attorney's acts go beyond the performance of a professional
duty owed to the client and, in addition, are done for his or
her own personal financial gain."84 If a plaintiff states a
claim that falls within the ambit of the statute, but not within
an exception, then the plaintiff must comply with the
statute's special procedure.85
The appellate court then examined de novo all of Berg's
allegations, regardless of whether labeled as a separate cause
of action or merely naming Sulmeyer as a defendant to an
existing claim, as they each involved the same conduct.8 6 The
court concluded that the allegations against Sulmeyer fell
within the scope of Section 1714.10.87 It then examined
whether the allegations qualified for either of the
exceptions.88 With reference to the first exception, the court
dealt with a question of first impression, which was whether
an attorney for an assignee for the benefit of the creditors
owes a duty to the creditors simply by virtue of representing
the assignee and charging fees for services performed for the
assignee. 89  The court declined to find such a duty,90
analogizing the case to an attorney for a trustee or
administrator for an estate who owes duties to the trustee or
administrator but not to the beneficiaries or the estate.91 As a
result, the court found that Sulmeyer did not owe an
independent duty to Berg by virtue of representing Sherwood
and charging fees for the services it rendered.92 To fall within
the second exception, a plaintiff must prove both that the
attorney acted outside the scope of its representation 93 and
that the attorney took actions in furtherance of its own
84. Berg, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 335.
85. See id. at 335.
86. Id. at 337, 339.
87. Id. at 340.
88. Id. at 341.
89. Id. at 341-42.
90. Berg, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 346. The court also rejected Berg's proposed
analogies to federal bankruptcy cases. Id.
91. Id. at 343.
92. Id. at 347.
93. Id. at 348.
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financial advantage.94 Since Sulmeyer performed services for
Sherwood within the scope of its representation and did not
receive compensation for anything beyond those services, its
conduct did not fall within the second exception to the
statute.95 Thus, because the allegations did not fall within
either of the exceptions, Berg had to comply with Section
1714.10.96 Since Berg could not, as a matter of law, comply
with the special procedure requirements, the appellate court
disallowed its pleadings for civil conspiracy. 97
D. Arbitration and Attorney Fees
Helping to clarify the contours of arbitration of attorney
fee disputes, the Sixth District Court of Appeal held that
clients' waivers of their rights to arbitration of attorney fee
disputes as listed in the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act
(MFAA) is not exclusive and that clients can otherwise waive
their rights to arbitration.98 In Law Offices of Dixon R.
Howell v. Valley, a client signed an unsecured promissory
note for payment of attorney fees.99 When the law firm sued
the client for breach of the promissory note, the client argued
that the attorney's claim must be dismissed because the law
firm failed to give the client notice of his right to arbitrate as
required by the MFAA.'00 The trial court, after nearly fifteen
months without the client asking for arbitration, dismissed
the law firm's action and awarded the client attorney fees
based on the attorney fee provision in the promissory note.10 1
The law firm appealed the ruling, and the client appealed the
94. Id. at 350. The court interpreted this furtherance of its own financial
advantage to mean something more than being compensated for services
rendered in furthering the interests of the client. Id.
95. Id. 349-50.
96. Berg, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 350.
97. Id. Berg could not make out a prima facie case as a matter of law
because the only viable claims for attorney-client conspiracy are those that fall
within Section 1714.10's exceptions. Id. at 335.
98. Law Offices of Dixon R. Howell v. Valley, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 512-13
(Ct. App. 2005).
99. Id. at 503.
100. Id. at 504. "[The MFAA was enacted to require, at the option of the
client, that the attorney arbitrate any fee dispute," id. at 505, and it "requires
that the attorney give the client notice of its right to arbitration at or before the
time the attorney brings suit or other proceeding to collect on unpaid fees or
costs." Id. at 506.
101. Id. at 504.
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attorney fee award. °2
The appellate court found that the trial court erroneously
assumed that an attorney's failure to give the client notice of
his right to arbitrate under the MFAA required mandatory
dismissal of the action for attorney fees. 3 Instead, the
appellate court found that dismissing an action for failure to
give the client notice was within the discretion of the court.
0 4
The trial court therefore abused its discretion in failing to
recognize and utilize its discretion. 05
In finding that the denial of the law firm's summary
judgment motion was incorrect, the appellate court rejected
all of the client's defenses to the summary judgment
motion. 10 6 First, the appellate court found that although the
law firm failed to give proper notice under MFAA, the client
waived his right to arbitrate. 7 Although MFAA lists specific
instances where a client waives his right to notice and to
arbitration generally, the court ruled that this list is not
exclusive.0 8 If the list were exclusive, then clients could
manipulate the court system to their advantage and avoid
paying attorney fees when attorneys failed to give notice
under MFAA, even when the clients knew of their arbitration
rights.0 9 Second, the appellate court rejected the client's
claim that the execution of an unsecured promissory note
violated Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct because an unsecured promissory note does not give
the attorney a present interest in the client's property.10
E. Commingling
In one of the two formal opinions issued in 2005, the
State Bar addressed the issues of overdraft protection on
client trust accounts ("CTA") and commingling; an attorney's
ethical obligations when a check is issued against a CTA
containing insufficient funds; and when an attorney must
withdraw his or her fees once they become fixed, and the
102. Id.
103. Id. at 508.
104. Law Offices, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 508.
105. Id. at 509.
106. Id. at 511.
107. Id. at 511.
108. Id. at 512-13.
109. Id.
110. Law Offices, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 520.
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funds have been deposited into the CTA.111 The State Bar
posed the following hypothetical: an attorney has an office
business account and a client trust account at a bank.1 1 2 The
attorney adds overdraft protection to the CTA by linking the
CTA to the business account.' A settlement check for the
client comes to the attorney, the attorney's fee becomes fixed,
and she deposits the check in the CTA."4 However, the bank
mis-deposits the check into the business account.115 The
attorney issues a check against the CTA for the expenses
incurred in pursuing the client's case." 6 Since the settlement
check was mis-deposited, there are insufficient funds in the
CTA, so the overdraft protection on the CTA kicks in, and the
bank honors the check.'17 The bank notifies the attorney and
the State Bar that it paid the check against insufficient funds
in the CTA.118  Three months after the settlement check
arrived, the attorney issues a check to the client and to
herself for her fees." 9  With this second issuance of checks
against insufficient funds, the bank contacts the attorney,
realizes its mistake, and corrects the error.1 20
First, the State Bar distinguished between the types of
overdraft protection that are ethical and those that are not
ethical because of the prohibition on commingling.'12  Two
types of overdraft protection do not result in commingling:
linking a CTA to a business account and extending a line of
credit. 122 These are acceptable because they "compensate[]
exactly for the amount that the overdraft exceeds the funds
on deposit, do[] not subject the client's funds to claims of the
attorney's creditors, and do[U not permit the attorney to use
111. Cal. State Bar, Formal Op. 169 (2005).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Cal. State Bar, Formal Op. 169 (2005).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. "Commingling is committed when a client's money is intermingled
with that of his attorney and its separate identity lost so that it may be used for
the attorney's personal expenses or subjected to claims of his creditors." Id.
(quoting Clark v. State Bar, 246 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1952)).
122. Cal. State Bar, Formal Op. 169 (2005).
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the client's funds."121 The State Bar's hypothetical posed a
linkage overdraft protection program, which did not violate
the ethical rule against commingling. 124  The State Bar
distinguished this scenario with "an overdraft protection
program that automatically deposits a fixed amount into a
CTA leaving a residue after the overdraft is satisfied." 2' This
type of overdraft protection program may subject the attorney
to discipline for commingling.'12
Second, the State Bar explained the obligations that
accompany the personal and non-delegable duty of an
attorney to "take reasonable care to protect client funds."27
The attorney must: (1) deposit funds, which may include his
or her personal funds, sufficient to satisfy any check written
against the CTA; (2) take reasonably prompt action to
determine what condition or event caused the overdraft; and
(3) possibly inform the client of the overdraft on the CTA if
the overdraft will negatively affect the client.' 21 Since the
bank in the hypothetical honored the check drawn on the
CTA due to the overdraft protection, none of these obligations
was triggered.129
Third, the State Bar clarified the time period in which an
attorney must withdraw his or her earned fees from the
CTA.130 Although attorney fees need not be withdrawn
immediately, they "must be withdrawn at the earliest
reasonable time after the [attorney's] interest in that portion
becomes fixed."'13 The State Bar gave a "rule of thumb" for a
reasonable time as "suggested by the standards for preserving
the identity of the funds and property of a client," which
require a monthly reconciliation: "an attorney should
withdraw the attorney's fees from the CTA at the time of the
monthly reconciliation after that portion has become fixed."'32
Thus, since the attorney in the hypothetical did not withdraw
her funds until three months had passed since her fees
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Cal. State Bar, Formal Op. 169 (2005).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 4-100(A)(2) (1992)).
132. Id.
970 [Vol: 46
ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
became fixed and the funds were deposited, she may not have
done so at the earliest reasonable time. 133
III. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Attorneys' conflicts of interest, in both civil and criminal
cases, composed another major area of review in 2005. The
California Supreme Court and four courts of appeal issued
opinions regarding attorneys' conflicts of interest.' The
opinions addressed three types of conflicts of interest:
conflicts between attorneys' interests and their clients'
13513interests, concurrent representation,136  and successive
representation. 137
A. Conflicts Between Attorneys' and Clients' Interests
A conflict of interest issue between attorneys' interests
and their clients' interests appeared in two cases in 2005.131
The California Supreme Court issued one of the opinions
ruling that an attorney who testified at a defendant's second
competency trial did not have an actual or potential conflict of
interest when the same attorney represented the defendant
in the penalty phase of his death penalty trial.139 In People v.
Dunkle, the defendant, who was diagnosed with chronic
paranoid schizophrenia, 140 was convicted and sentenced to
death for the murders of two teenage boys.' 4 ' The defendant
had two competency hearings,4 2 and his attorney testified
about his interaction with the defendant at the second
competency hearing.4 3  The judge in the first competency
hearing, and the jury in the second, found the defendant
competent to stand trial.'4
On his automatic appeal to the California Supreme
133. Id.
134. See infra Part III.
135. See infra Part III.A.
136. See infra Part III.B.
137. See infra Part III.C.
138. People v. Dunkle, 116 P.3d 494 (Cal. 2005); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 818 (Ct. App. 2005).
139. Dunkle, 116 P.3d at 530-33.
140. Id. at 509.
141. Id. at 502.
142. Id. at 509.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Court, the defendant claimed that his trial counsel labored
under a conflict of interest because his trial counsel had
testified at the defendant's second competency hearing and
then represented the defendant in the penalty phase of his
trial where the defense centered on the defendant's mental
state. 145 The defendant claimed that the trial court knew or
should have known of this conflict and, by not taking action to
deal with it, violated his constitutional right to counsel
without conflicts. 14 6 Under the United States Constitution, a
defendant must show an actual conflict of interest, meaning
one that affected counsel's performance. 147  However, under
the California State Constitution, "a defendant need only
show a potential conflict of interest, so long as the record
supports an 'informed speculation' that the asserted conflict
adversely affected counsel's performance. ' 14  The defendant
claimed that there was a conflict of interest because the
attorney had an ethical obligation to withdraw from the case
and testify for the defendant in the penalty phase of the trial,
but the attorney instead promoted his self-interest in
continued employment on the case.1
49
The supreme court failed to find either a potential or an
actual conflict of interest. "[A] n attorney must withdraw from
representation, absent the client's informed written consent,
whenever he or she knows or should know he or she ought to
be a material witness in the client's cause."1 50 To determine
whether the defendant's attorney should have withdrawn
from the case to testify at the penalty phase, the court applied
the factors laid out in Comden v. Superior Court,15 1 and
concluded that defendant's attorney did not have a duty to
withdraw from the case and testify.'52 Although the court
declined to say that there could never be an actual conflict of
interest in this type of case,1 53 it refused to recognize an
actual conflict of interest in the mere fact that a defense
attorney has some unique personal information as to the
145. Dunkle, 116 P.3d at 530.
146. Id. at 530-31.
147. Id. at 531.
148. Id. (quoting People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 241 (Cal. 1998)).
149. Dunkle, 116 P.3d at 531.
150. Id. at 531-32.
151. Comden v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
152. Dunkle, 116 P.3d at 532.
153. Id.
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defendant's competency that might be relevant to the penalty
phase because this situation is present in every case. 54 The
court also did not find a potential conflict of interest because,
based on the facts known to the trial court, there was no
possibility of a conflict of interest that obligated the trial
court to make a further inquiry.1 5 The court rejected all of
defendant's factual arguments for why the trial court should
have made a further inquiry, citing tactical and strategic
decisions that an non-conflicted attorney would make."6
The conflict between an attorney's own interests and
those of his client also arose in the context of class-action
lawsuits. The Second District Court of Appeal disqualified a
law firm and its co-counsel firm who were serving as class
counsel in a class action in which an attorney from the law
firm was also the class representative. 57 In Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Superior Court, attorney Lawrence Cagney was the
named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit against Apple
Computer, Inc. alleging that Apple, in connection with one of
its rebate programs, had collected excess tax from consumers
in violation of California's unfair competition statute.158 Two
firms were engaged to represent the class: Westrup Klick
LLP, where Cagney was an attorney, and the Law Offices of
Allan A. Sigel.159 Sigel served as co-counsel on the case, as
well as on thirteen other class actions filed under the same
statute within four years.160 Apple moved to disqualify both
Westrup and Sigel.16' The trial court denied the motion,
Apple appealed, and then Westrup withdrew from the case.'62
The appellate court ruled that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to disqualify both Westrup and Sigel
"because an insurmountable conflict of interest exists
between the attorneys for the putative class (including
plaintiff) and the putative class itself."163  First, the court
154. Id.
155. Id. at 533.
156. See id. at 532-33.
157. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 818, 820 (Ct.
App. 2005).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 821.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Apple Computer, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 833. The appellate court ruled on
Westrup's disqualification despite the fact that the issue was moot because of
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noted that class attorneys, their relatives, or their business
associates are generally barred from serving as class
representatives.1 4  This is because courts fear that class
attorneys, induced by the possibility of huge attorney fees,
will settle on terms that are not as favorable to the absent
class members' interests as they could be.165 Further, the
class representative has a duty to monitor the class attorney
"to ensure that [class counsel does] not sacrifice the interests
of the class in order to maximize its own recovery."166 The
court applied the same rationale to law firms such as
Westrup and Sigel.'67 As for Westrup, "substituting a partner
as counsel [would] not suffice as an antidote" to the conflict of
interest problem.'68 Indeed, "Cagney and Westrup ... placed
themselves in a position of divided loyalties-their own
financial interest in recovery attorney fees versus their
obligation to the putative class to maximize the recovery of
monetary and other relief," and Westrup therefore had to be
disqualified.'69 Likewise, Sigel had to be disqualified because
of the "close business connection" between Cagney, Westrup,
and Sigel. 70 Since the two firms maintained thirteen other
similar class actions, six of which were still active, the court
recognized a "financial relationship and interdependence
between Cagney and the Sigel firm" which could result in
Cagney failing to perform his monitoring duties as class
representative and Sigel improperly seeking to maximize its
attorney fees. 171 As a result, the appellate court disqualified
the Sigel firm.'72 Lastly, although the court found that
"[blecause Cagney, as an attorney at Westrup Klick, may
benefit from attorney fees recovered in the other litigation [in
which the two firms were involved], he is not sufficiently
independent to serve as the class representative in this
Westrup's withdrawal. Id. at 822.
164. Id. at 822.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 832 (quoting In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257,
262 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
167. See Apple Computer, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 823-24, 831.
168. Id. at 824 (quoting Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085,
1092 (3d Cir. 1976)).
169. Apple Computer, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 829.
170. Id. at 830.
171. Id. at 831.
172. Id. at 833.
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[case], "  it did not order Cagney's removal as class
representative. 1
74
B. Concurrent Representation
Without informed, written consent, concurrent
representation, in which an attorney simultaneously
represents two or more clients with adverse interests, is
unethical regardless of whether there is a substantial
relationship between the cases or whether confidences have
passed.175 The rule against concurrently representing clients
with adverse interests is per se176 because the concern is the
duty of loyalty, not only the duty of confidentiality. 77
Concurrent representation was the subject of one case in
2005. In Cal West Nurseries, Inc. v. Superior Court, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that a law firm may not
represent concurrent clients whose interests are adverse even
if the law firm represents one client in an unrelated action,
and the other client in an action in which both clients are
parties but the representation is against only non-client
parties.1 8 In Cal West, A.J. West Ranch was a defendant in a
tort action, and it cross-complained for equitable indemnity
and contribution against Cal West Nurseries. 7 9 Cal West
likewise filled a cross-complaint against Ranch for implied
indemnity and comparative appointment.' Ranch hired the
law firm of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP to
represent it in its action against Cal West.'8 ' When Lewis
sought to take depositions of Cal West witnesses, Cal West
objected because Lewis represented it in an unrelated
173. Id. at 832.
174. See id. at 833.
175. Cal West Nurseries, Inc. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 170, 173-74
(Ct. App. 2005).
176. Id. at 174.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 172.
179. Id. at 173.
180. Id. at 172.
181. Lewis also represented another party, Brongo Construction against
whom Cal West had cross-complaints. Cal West, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 171. Cal
West objected to Lewis representing Brongo, and Lewis likewise ceased from
representing Brongo. Id. However, Cal West apparently initially did not move
to disqualify Lewis from representing Brongo, see id. at 172, and waited to
argue that the law firm should be disqualified from representing all other
parties to the action until its reply on appeal. Id. at 176. The court of appeal
thus refused to consider the claim. Id.
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action.'82 Lewis withdrew its representation of Ranch in both
the cross-complaints between Ranch and Cal West, but it
continued to represent Ranch on its cross-complaints against
other parties to the action.183 Cal West moved to disqualify
Lewis, but the trial court denied the motion, and Cal West
appealed. 184
The appellate court ruled that Lewis could not represent
Ranch against any other parties to the action.'85 Although
Lewis ceased representing Ranch against Cal West, it
represented Ranch against other parties to the action. 18 6
Lewis argued that by no longer representing one client
against another directly, it eliminated any conflict. 8 7  The
court rejected this argument because Ranch and Cal West
were still adverse to each other in the action, regardless of
whether Lewis was representing one directly against the
other. 18 8 The court rejected the approach of the New York
City Bar Association and Restatement Third of Law
Governing Lawyers, which allows a lawyer to avoid the
conflict by limiting the scope of representation. 89 Instead, it
found that California allows attorneys to continue
representation of clients with adverse interests in unrelated
matters only when they obtain written consent after full
disclosure.' 90 As a result, the court ruled that Lewis must
comply with its duty of loyalty to Cal West and disqualified
Lewis from representing Ranch against any party to the
action.191
182. Id. at 172.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 174.
187. Cal West, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 174.
188. Id. The court explained that
[a] client who learns that his or her lawyer is also representing a
litigation adversary, even with respect to a matter wholly unrelated to
the one for which counsel was retained, cannot long be expected to
sustain the level of confidence and trust in counsel that is one of the
foundations of the professional relationship.
Id. (quoting Flatt v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 542 (1994).
189. Cal West, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 175.
190. Id.
191. Id.
976 [Vol: 46
ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
C. Successive Representation
In cases of successive representation, the main concern is
the duty of confidentiality.192 California Rule of Professional
Conduct 3-310(E) prohibits an attorney from representing a
new client whose interests are adverse to a former client
when the attorney obtained confidential information that is
material to the representation of the new client.193 Courts
apply a "substantial relationship test" to begin the analysis of
whether an attorney must be disqualified."' If there is a
substantial relationship between the former and current
representation, and material, confidential information
normally would have passed between the attorney and former
client, then the court will assume that confidences have
passed, and the attorney will be disqualified unless he or she
can prove that confidences have not passed. 195  If no
substantial relationship exists, then the presumption that
confidences have passed does not apply, and the attorney may
be able to represent the new client as long as confidences did
not actually pass. 96  In addition to the successive
representation rules, courts will apply "vicarious
disqualification" and disqualify an entire law firm if an
attorney at the firm is conflicted. 97 With this imputation of
the conflict, disqualification is mandatory unless an attorney
"can show that there was no opportunity for confidential
information to be divulged." 98  Two cases addressed
disqualification of attorneys where successive representation
was an issue. 99
In one case, the Fifth District Court of.Appeal ruled that
plaintiffs' counsel must be disqualified after associating
outside counsel who had a one-hour interview with
defendants' counsel three years prior to associating with
192. Id. at 173.
193. Goldberg v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 116, 120 (Ct.
App. 2005).
194. Id. at 121.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting City Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125, 135 (Ct.
App. 2002).
199. Pound v. DeMera DeMera Cameron, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 922 (Ct. App.
2005); Goldberg v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 116 (Ct. App.
2005).
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plaintiffs' counsel. 00 In Pound v. DeMera DeMera Cameron,
"[tihe contentious nature of [a] corporate divorce set[] the
stage for the dispute."20 1 The attorney for the defendant
accountancy corporation that plaintiff-employees were
leaving interviewed various attorneys to represent two
individual defendants.0 2 One of the attorneys interviewed
was Peter S. Bradley. 20 3  Defendant-corporation's attorney
declared that he had a one-hour interview with Bradley in
which "he discussed the case in specific terms, including
issues, personalities, vulnerabilities, and other topics
properly described as attorney work product."20 4 Defendants,
however, chose to employ another attorney.2 5 Three years
after the interview with defendant-corporation's counsel,
plaintiffs' counsel, Andrew B. Jones consulted with and
associated Bradley as counsel. 20 6 "The only thing Bradley told
Jones about his meeting with [defendant-corporation's
counsel] was that the case involved corporate law issues and
Jones was the adverse attorney."2 7 On defendant's motion,
the trial court disqualified Bradley but did not disqualify
Jones.20 8
The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision not
to disqualify Jones.209 The appellate court ruled that Bradley
was properly disqualified because he successively represented
clients whose interests were adverse, and there was a
substantial relationship since it was the same case, so
confidential information presumptively passed.2 0 The court
also found that Jones had to be disqualified because he
associated Bradley as counsel, who had "the most egregious
conflict of interest."2" The fact that Bradley was associated
as counsel and not hired as a partner or associate of Jones'
firm did not alter the application of vicarious
200. Pound, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 922.
201. Id. at 925.
202. Id. at 924-25.
203. Id. at 925.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Pound, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 925.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 930.
210. Id. at 926.
211. Id. at 928, 926 (quoting People ex rel. Dep't of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil
Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 379 (Cal. 1999)).
978 [Vol: 46
ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
disqualification.212
Another appellate court examined whether confidences
had actually passed in the context of a law firm. The Second
District Court of Appeal ruled that, in determining whether
to disqualify a law firm, a trial court may inquire into
whether confidences actually passed between an attorney
who represented a former client whose interests are adverse
to a current law firm client and other lawyers in the firm
when that attorney has since left the firm.213 In Goldberg v.
Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., former in-house counsel to
Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. sued Warner for, among other
claims, gender discrimination, violation of the whistleblower
statute, and retaliatory termination.2 4  The plaintiff then
moved to disqualify Warner's counsel, Mitchell Silberbger &
Knupp LLP because she claimed that she divulged
confidential information regarding her employment contract
with Warner to former Mitchell Silberbger partner Eugene
Salomon.
The appellate court held that Mitchell Silberbger should
not be disqualified because there was no indication that
Salomon had disclosed any confidential information, and he
had left Mitchell Silberbger approximately three years before
Goldberg's matter began.21 6 The appellate court found that
the trial court appropriately inquired into whether Salomon
had actually passed confidential information to other
attorneys at Mitchell Silberbger and properly denied the
motion to disqualify the firm when it determined that
confidences did not pass.21 7 In so doing, the appellate court
agreed with another appellate court that "at some point, it
ceases to make sense to apply a presumption of imputed
knowledge as a lawyer moves from firm to firm."21 Indeed,
"[wihen . . . the relationship between the tainted attorneys
and nontainted attorneys is in the past, there is no need to
'rely on the fiction of imputed knowledge to safeguard client
212. Pound, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 928.
213. Goldberg v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 116, 125 (Ct.
App. 2005).
214. Id. at 118.
215. Id. at 119.
216. Id. at 118, 120.
217. Id. at 123.
218. Id. at 123 (agreeing with Adams v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d
116 (Ct. App. 2001)).
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confidentiality' and opportunity exists for a 'dispassionate
assessment' of whether confidential information was actually
exchanged."2 19 The court found support for this more relaxed
rule in the fact that both the ABA and other jurisdictions
follow such a rule.22 ° The court did, however, distinguish
situations in which an attorney is still employed at a firm, in
which case vicarious disqualification would likely apply
because, for example, "there would be no practical way of
ensuring that, despite his best intentions, Salomon would not
let slip some confidential information he may not even be
aware that he possesses."221
IV. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The California Supreme Court issued the only opinion
regarding the attorney-client privilege in 2005. The court
held that an unincorporated organization, including those
that do not fall into the categories specifically listed in the
comment to Evidence Code section 951, may hold the
attorney-client privilege, but it reiterated that when the
holder is a natural person, the privilege ends when the estate
is probated and the personal representative is discharged. 222
In HCL Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court, HCL Properties,
an entity formed by Bing Crosby's executor and heirs to
manage Crosby's various financial interests, sued MCA
Records for underpaying royalties it owed on three record
contracts.223 During discovery, HCL and Crosby's former law
firm failed to produce certain documents, claiming the
attorney-client privilege protected the information.224
The supreme court first determined that under Evidence
Code sections 953 and 954, "an individual, an association, or
an organization may qualify as a client, and a living or
existing client is the holder of the privilege initially."225 HCL
argued that "Bing Crosby Enterprises", a loosely-termed
entity formed during Crosby's lifetime that contained
219. Goldberg, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 125 (quoting Adams, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
123).
220. Id. at 126.
221. Id. at 123.
222. HCL Props., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 105 P.3d 560, 569 (Cal. 2005).
223. Id. at 562.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 564.
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Crosby's assets and that Crosby's employees informally
named,226 was an informal corporation that held the privilege
initially.227 While the supreme court found that an informal
organization, including one that does not fall into one of the
categories listed in the comment to Evidence Code section 951
defining "client," may be the holder of the privilege,228 Bing
Crosby Enterprises did not hold the privilege in this case.229
The court found that the key person managing Crosby's
assets, as well as his attorneys, believed that they worked for
Crosby personally and individually. 230 Furthermore, Crosby
paid his employees personally. 231 The evidence thus indicated
that Crosby himself ran his business affairs, not Bing Crosby
Enterprises in a representative capacity.232 As a result, the
court ruled that Crosby himself held the privilege, not Bing
Crosby Enterprises.233
As a consequence of Crosby personally holding the
privilege, the privilege could not transfer to HCL by
successorship.234  Only a personal representative of the
deceased can claim the privilege because the privilege passes
to the personal representative upon the client's death.235
When the estate is probated, and there is no longer a personal
representative to claim the privilege, the privilege
terminates.236 The court further held that an estate is not an
organization capable of receiving the privilege and passing it
to a successor organization because the legislature clearly
wanted to limit the privilege to passing only to the personal
226. Id. at 562-63.
227. Id. at 564.
228. HCL Props., 105 P.3d at 565. Indeed, the supreme court specifically
stated,
[We do not suggest that entities formed to manage the business affairs
of a natural person can never be clients or never hold the attorney-
client privileges in their own right. Nor do we find that a personal
representative's assertion of the privilege categorically forecloses others
from claiming it as to the same communications.
Id. at 569.
229. Id. at 566.
230. Id. at 565-66.
231. Id. at 565.
232. Id. at 566.
233. Id.
234. See HCL Props., 105 P.3d at 569.
235. Id. at 567.
236. Id.
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representative upon the client's death."7  Thus, when
Crosby's estate was probated and his personal representative
was discharged, the privilege terminated.238 As a result, HCL
could not claim the attorney-client privilege.239
V. CONFIDENTIALITY
In the second of two formal opinions issued in 2005, the
California State Bar clarified the potential duties of
confidentiality of attorneys who maintain websites through
which visitors seeking legal advice and counsel can
communicate with attorneys by electronic means.240 The
State Bar posed the following hypothetical: a law firm
maintains a website with a link allowing visitors to submit
information about their legal problems. 2 1 Before the visitors
can submit the information to the law firm, they must agree
to terms, which include the fact that visitors will not pay for
the initial response; no attorney-client relationship will be
formed; no confidential relationship will be formed; and to
retain the law firm, the visitor must enter into a fee
agreement with the law firm, which is not completed by the
initial, free response.242 A woman seeking advice about a
potential divorce and custody battle writes to the law firm
through the website, revealing a prior extramarital affair
about which the husband does not know.243 After receiving
this information, the law firm realizes that it already
represents the husband.2 " The issue then is whether the law
firm may be disqualified after its initial consultation with the
wife. 245
The State Bar first noted that an attorney may owe a
duty of confidentiality to a potential client even when no
attorney-client relationship exists.246 For purposes of the
hypothetical situation, the State Bar assumed that neither an
237. Id. at 567-68.
238. Id. at 567.
239. See id. at 568.
240. Cal. State Bar, Formal Op. 168 (2005).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Cal. State Bar, Formal Op. 168 (2005).
[Vol: 46982
ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
express nor implied attorney-client relationship existed. 247 It
then addressed whether a duty of confidentiality still
existed.248  A duty of confidentiality may arise if the
prospective client engages the attorney in his or her
professional capacity for the purpose of gaining legal advice
or representation. 249 For the duty of confidentiality to attach,
the attorney must "evidence, by words or conduct, a
willingness to engage in a confidential consultation with [the
prospective client] .,,250 This requirement was satisfied in the
hypothetical because the website invited visitors to relate
facts about their legal problems.251
Whether an attorney owes a duty of confidentiality
ultimately depends on whether the prospective client had a
reasonable belief, gathered from the surrounding
circumstances, that he or she was consulting the attorney in
his or her professional capacity and that the information
passed was confidential.2 2 In the hypothetical, the State Bar
found that the prospective client (the wife) had a reasonable
belief that the information she gave would be confidential
because merely stating that there was no confidential
relationship was not a sufficient explanation for a non-
lawyer.253 The wife simply could have thought that not
having a confidential relationship was synonymous with not
having an attorney-client relationship.254 As a result, if a
court deemed the information the wife related to be material
to the divorce or custody battle, then the law firm could be
disqualified from representing the husband.255
Although the law firm's disclaimer in this hypothetical
was not sufficient to negate the wife's reasonable belief that
her information would be kept confidential, the State Bar
gave two possible ways for a law firm to avoid the duty of
confidentiality to prospective clients visiting the website.5 6
One is to more clearly explain in layperson's terms what
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (quoting Cal. State Bar, Formal Op. 161 (2003)).
251. Cal. State Bar, Formal Op. 168 (2005).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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agreeing to a lack of a confidential relationship means. 25 17 The
State Bar indicated that the wife would not have had a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality if the website had
said, "I understand and agree that Law Firm will have no
duty to keep confidential the information I am now
transmitting to Law Firm."25  The second is to first solicit
only information relevant to a conflicts check (e.g., names of
spouses) before gathering confidential information.2 9
Although these solutions are not exclusive, the State Bar
cautioned, "it is important that lawyers who invite the public
to submit questions on their web sites, and do not want to
assume a duty of confidentiality to the inquirers, plainly state
the legal effect of a waiver of confidentiality." 26 °
VI. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL: GOVERNMENT WHISTLEBLOWERS
One legislative proposal, introduced by Assembly
Member Fran Pavley, which is moving through the California
Assembly, would alter the contours of government attorneys'
duties of confidentiality, particularly when those attorneys
become whistleblowers. Assembly Bill 1612 ("AB 1612")
would grant attorneys who, in the course of representing a
government agency, learn of improper government activity,
two avenues for addressing the conduct: report up the ladder
and out the door.26' First, an attorney who learns of such
activity may "[ulrge reconsideration of the matter while
explaining its likely consequences to the organization" and/or
"[r]efer the matter to a higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter,
referral to the highest internal authority that can act on
257. Cal. State Bar, Formal Op. 168 (2005).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Assemb. B. 1612, 2005-06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005), available at
http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm. AB 1612(e) defines
"improper government activity" as
conduct by the governmental organization or by its agent that meets
one or more of the following requirements: (1) It constitutes the use of
the organization's official authority or influence by the agent to commit
a crime, fraud, or other serious and willful violation of law. (2) It
involves the agent's willful misuse of public funds, willful breach of
fiduciary duty, or willful or corrupt misconduct in office. (3) It involves
the agent's willful omission to perform his or her official duty.
Cal. Assemb. B. 1612(e).
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behalf of the organization."262 In addition to these up-the-
ladder options, under certain circumstances, and
"[niotwithstanding subdivision (e) of [Business and
Professions Code] Section 6068," attorneys may go out the
door to "the law enforcement agency charged with
responsibility over the matter or to any governmental agency
or official charged with overseeing or regulating the
matter."2 63 In order to use this out-the-door approach, the
attorney must have used the up-the-ladder approach, or must
reasonably believe that the up-the-ladder approach would be
unreasonable and futile, or must reasonably believe that the
top official who could act for the organization participated in
the improper activity.2" If one of these conditions is met, the
attorney may go out-the-door only if the seriousness of the
conduct warrants it, and the law does not otherwise prohibit
it; the improper conduct uses the organization's authority or
influence to commit a crime or perpetrate a fraud; and the
action is necessary to prevent or rectify "substantial harm to
the public interest or to the governmental organization
resulting from the improper governmental activity."2 65
The up-the-ladder approach does not implicate
confidentiality concerns, and Rule of Professional Conduct 3-
600 already authorizes it. 266  However, the out-the-door
approach does implicate confidentiality concerns. As
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) provides, "It is
the duty of an attorney . to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve
the secrets, of his or her client."267 Further, under existing
law, an attorney who exhausts the up-the-ladder options may
only withdraw from representation.268 Although government
whistleblowers receive protection against retaliation as civil
servants under whistleblower protection laws,269  they
262. Cal. Assemb. B. 1612(a).
263. Cal. Assemb. B. 1612(b).
264. Cal. Assemb. B. 1612(b)(1).
265. Cal. Assemb. B. 1612(b)(2).
266. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 3-600 (1988).
267. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (2006).
268. Public Agency Attorneys: Concomitant Duties to Clients and to Public,
A.B. 1612, 2005-06 Leg. (Cal. 2006), available at
http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm. See CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 6068(e) (2006); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 3-600 (1988).
269. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8547-8547.12 (2006).
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presently may be subject to discipline under Business and
Professions Code section 6068(e).2 70  AB 1612 creates an
exception to section 6068(e) by providing that attorneys who
utilize the second of these approaches "reasonably and in
good faith" will not be subject to discipline.27'
The State Bar Board of Governors proposed an
amendment to the Rules of Professional Conduct to address
the problem of government whistleblowers being subject to
discipline in 2002.272 The California Supreme Court,
however, declined to adopt the rule because it conflicted with
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). 273 Thus, AB
1612 is an attempt to codify the amendment that the State
Bar proposed. 4 The State Bar Board of Governors recently
voted to oppose AB 1612 because, as the State Bar deputy
executor director explained, new developments, such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, were already placing the duty
"under siege."275 The Board of governors did, however, refer
the matter to the Commission on the Revision of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. 6
AB 1612's two predecessors, proposed in 2002 and 2004
and essentially identical, were passed unanimously by the
Legislature.277 However, each was vetoed by Governors Gray
Davis and Arnold Schwarzenegger.278  Governor
Schwarzenegger gave the following explanation for vetoing
270. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (2006). Although Department of
Insurance attorney Cindy Ossias was not disciplined for exposing Commissioner
Chuck Quackenbush's wrongdoing, the law is not clear that other government
whistleblowers likewise will not face discipline. Public Agency Attorneys:
Concomitant Duties to Clients and to Public, Assemb. B. 1612, 2005-06 Leg.
(Cal. 2006), available at http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm.
271. Cal. Assembl. B. 1612(c).
272. Public Agency Attorneys: Concomitant Duties to Clients and to Public,
Assemb. B. 1612, 2005-06 Leg. • (Cal. 2006), available at
http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Nancy McCarthy, Bar Opposes Whistleblower Bill, CAL. ST. B.J., Apr.
2006, available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-cbj.jsp?sCategoryPath=/Home/Attorney
%20Resources/California%2OBar%20Journal/April2006&TYPE=JSP&sCatHtml
Path=calbar -cbjheadlines.jsp&sCatHtmlTitle=Top%20Headlines.
276. Id.
277. Public Agency Attorneys: Concomitant Duties to Clients and to Public,
Assemb. B. 1612, 2005-06 Leg. (Cal. 2006), available at
http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm.
278. Id.
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the former bill: "This is a well-intended bill and I applaud the
efforts to expose wrongdoing within government. However,
this bill would condone violations of the attorney-client
privilege, which is the cornerstone of our legal system. This
bill will have a chilling effect on when government officials
would have an attorney present when making decisions."279
In response, proponents of AB 1612 point out that
government attorneys represent the government entity, not
the official.8 ° With this third attempt moving through the
legislature, and its referral to the Revision Commission, the
government whistleblower exception will likely remain an
issue in 2006.
VII. ATTORNEYS MISSING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In the one opinion addressing the problem of missed
statute of limitations deadlines in 2005, a court of appeal
faulted an attorney for such a failure but did not recommend
disciplinary action.2"' In County of Los Angeles v. Superior
Court, the Second District Court of Appeal ruled that a
plaintiffs claim against the county for, among other things,
negligently hiring, supervising, and retaining an employee
who raped her while she was housed in a juvenile facility was
time barred.28 2 The attorney in the case filed a claim with'the
County on behalf of the minor plaintiff, though neither the
attorney nor the minor's mother knew where plaintiff was at
the time.2 3  Nearly a year later, the County mailed the
attorney notice that plaintiffs claim was denied, but the
attorney never received that letter.28 4 More than a year and a
half after the County mailed the notice of denial, the plaintiff
filed an action in court. 5 The County moved for summary
judgment arguing that the claim was time barred.28 6
The appellate court found that Code of Civil Procedure
Section 340.1, which governs the statute of limitations for
victims of childhood sexual abuse, was not the applicable law
279. Id.
280. Cal. Assemb. B. 1612 (legislative findings (3)).
281. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 445, 450-
51 (Ct. App. 2005).
282. Id. at 447.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 447-48.
286. Id. at 448.
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but rather that Government Code section 954.6, part of the
California Tort Claims Act that governs actions against
public entities and employees, governed.8 7 Section 954.6
requires that an action be filed within six months of when the
public entity places notice of denial of the claim in the mail.288
This six month statute of limitations applies "regardless of
whether notice is actually received."2 89 The court of appeal
placed the blame for failing to file the plaintiffs claim within
six months of the mailing of the County's denial on the
attorney:
Having filed the claim on plaintiffs behalf, [the attorney]
was charged with knowledge of the six-month period and
was obligated to inquire as to the status of the claim if he
did not receive a written rejection notice within a
reasonable time after the County's time to act or reject the
claim passed.29 °
VIII. ATTORNEYS ENTERING INTO STIPULATIONS FOR CLIENTS
The scope of n attorney's implicit authority was the
subject of one court of appeal decision. The Second District
Court of Appeal upheld monetary and terminating sanctions
against a plaintiff who violated a discovery request
stipulation into which his attorney entered, which was not
signed by the court or the referee.291 In Mileikowsky v. Tenet
Healthsystem, the plaintiff, a medical doctor, sued a medical
center claiming that the medical center violated his due
process rights in rejecting his challenge to a determination
that he voluntarily resigned from the medical center where he
performed medical and surgical procedures. 292  The lower
court granted plaintiff a preliminary injunction preventing
the medical center from restricting plaintiffs medical and
surgical privileges.2 93 Plaintiff filed a new complaint alleging
that the medical center violated the preliminary injunction by
having security personnel accompany him everywhere, and
287. County of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 448-50.
288. Id. at 448.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 451.
291. Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 831, 844 (Ct. App.
2005).
292. Id. at 833.
293. Id.
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that the medical center retaliated against him for reporting
violations of medical standards and for assisting another
plaintiff in a malpractice action against the center.2 94 During
the discovery process, the medical association made five
motions to compel plaintiff to comply with discovery
requests. 95 After the fifth motion to compel, counsel for
plaintiff and defendant signed a "stipulation and order"
agreeing that plaintiff would supplement his discovery
responses by a specified date. 296  Neither the court nor the
referee signed the document.297 On defendant's fifth request
for terminating sanctions, defendant argued that plaintiff
violated the stipulation because he did not provide the
additional discovery.298
The appellate court upheld the trial court's award of
terminating and monetary sanctions. 299  First, the court
observed that an attorney may enter into a stipulation that is
binding on the client if it is within the implicit authority of
the attorney.300  "An attorney is authorized by virtue of his
employment to bind the client in procedural matters arising
during the course of the action .. .including enter[ing] into
stipulations and agreements in all matters of procedure
during the progress of the trial."30 ' In this case, when the
attorney properly entered into a stipulation regarding the
discovery requests, that stipulation served as the order that
was necessary to impose the sanctions. 2  The court saw "the
stipulation . . . as tantamount to the requisite order."3
3
Indeed, "by signing the stipulation, counsel essentially
waived [plaintiffs] right to insist on a formal order
compelling responses as a precursor to an issuance of
evidentiary, issue, or terminating sanctions. That the court
and referee did not sign the stipulation did not negate the fact
294. Id. at 834. The reason the medial center gave for requiring security
personnel to accompany plaintiff everywhere was that members were concerned
about plaintiffs alleged history of abusive behavior and violence against
medical personnel. Id.
295. Id. at 838.
296. Id. at 839.
297. Mileikowsky, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 839.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 844.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 842.
303. Mileikowsky, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 843.
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that this was the parties' agreement." °4  Lastly, "[a]
stipulation may result in impairment of a party's rights. 'But
a poor outcome is not a principled reason to set aside a
stipulation by counsel.' 30 5
IX. LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
Criminal cases monopolized both the legal malpractice
and ineffective assistance of counsel decisions in 2005. In one
legal malpractice case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
ruled that former criminal defendants with claims against
their defense attorneys for legal malpractice have a right to a
jury trial on the question of actual innocence. 6 In Salisbury
v. County of Orange, a concert-goer named Chad Salisbury,
represented by a public defender, was convicted of assault
with a deadly weapon along with a hate crime
enhancement. 7 With the aid of private counsel, Salisbury
was granted a new trial on claims of newly discovered
evidence-and ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was
acquitted.0 8 Salisbury then filed a legal malpractice action
against his former counsel alleging that he was innocent and
that he would not have been convicted but for the negligence
of the public defender.30 9 The lower court judge ruled that
Salisbury had not established that he was actually innocent,
and therefore dismissed the case.310  Salisbury appealed
arguing that a jury rather than the trial judge should have
determined whether he was actually innocent.3 11
All plaintiffs in a civil legal malpractice action must
prove that their attorneys breached their duties to use
professional skill, causation, and actual damage or loss.3 12
Plaintiffs with claims against their criminal defense
attorneys generally must prove two further requirements:
relief from criminal conviction and actual innocence by a
304. Id. at 844.
305. Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 92
Cal. Rptr. 2d 290 (Ct. App. 2000)).
306. Salisbury v. County of Orange, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 831, 832 (Ct. App. 2005).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 833.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 835.
311. Id.
312. Salisbury, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 835.
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preponderance of the evidence. 13 The requirement of actual
innocence is necessary even though it means that a civil
damages remedy for legal malpractice is not available for
guilty criminal defendants who received negligent
representation. 314 This, the California Supreme Court once
reasoned, is justifiable because the safeguards present in the
criminal justice system, such as an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on appeal or in a habeas corpus petition,
provide guilty criminal defendants adequate protection.31
Despite the limited availability of this legal malpractice
claim, the appellate court ruled that people with a legal
malpractice claims have a right to a jury trial on the issue of
factual innocence.31 6 Under the California Constitution, there
is a right to jury trial in civil actions, including legal
malpractice actions.3 1 7 However, when there is a trial-within-
a-trial, such as when one must prove actual innocence,
whether there is a right to a jury trial depends on whether
the issues are factual or legal.1 When the issues are factual,
as with the question of actual innocence, there is a right to a
jury trial.3 1 9 Thus, Salisbury had a right to a jury trial to
determine actual innocence.2 °
In another legal malpractice action, for public policy
reasons, the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that a
criminal defendant who knowingly and willfully engages in
conduct that subjects him to criminal punishment cannot
maintain a legal malpractice action against the attorney who
caused the defendant to engage in the conduct. 2 ' In
Chapman v. Superior Court, a member of the Board of
Commissioners of the San Diego Unified Port District told the
Port Board's attorney that he planned to enter into a business
relationship with a power company after learning that the
Port District planned to enter into various agreements with
313. Id.
314. Id. at 836.
315. Id. (referencing Wiley v. County of San Diego, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 672, 677-
78 (1998)).
316. Salisbury, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 832.
317. Id. at 836. The court distinguished the situation in which a trial court
judge could rule on a summary judgment motion where there are no issues of
triable fact regarding actual innocence. Id. at 838.
318. Id. at 837.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 838.
321. Chapman v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 852, 855 (Ct. App. 2005).
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the power company to operate and then decommission aging
power plants.2 2 The Port District's attorney told the board
member that he could enter into a business relationship with
the power company, but that he had to disclose any income he
received from the power company and had to abstain from
any board decisions that involved the power company. 23 The
board member entered into a contract with the power
company to attempt to purchase a power plant. 24 Eventually
the business relationship turned into a consulting contract
between the board member and the power company, which
prohibited the board member "'from advising, counseling or
otherwise assisting any competitor or potential competitor of
[the power company], including the Port District.' 325 The
board member was making a six-figure salary from the
contract. 26  The Port District attorney again advised the
board member to disclose income from and refrain from
decisions involving the power company.3 27
When a memorandum from the attorney to the Port
District revealing the consulting relationship and the
attorney's advice leaked to the media, the board member
resigned and pled guilty to one felony violation of
Government Code section 1090, which "prohibits an
officeholder from having a financial interest in any contract
made by the public agency of which he or she is a member."328
The court imposed $11,000 in fines and required the board
member to pay $249,000 in restitution. 29 The board member
then sued the Port District's attorney and the Port District on
a respondeat superior theory for legal malpractice alleging
that the attorney should have advised the board member to
resign from the Board to comply with section 1090.330
The appellate court granted summary judgment to the
Port District and its attorney.3 31 Analogizing the case to a
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 855-56.
326. Id. at 856.
327. Chapman, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 856.
328. Id. at 857, 854.
329. Id. at 857-58.
330. Id. at 858.
331. Id. at 864.
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Texas court of appeal case,332 the appellate court held that
public policy prohibited someone who knowing and willfully
engages in conduct that subjects him or her to criminal
liability from maintaining a legal malpractice action against
the attorney whose advice caused the person to engage in the
conduct. 33 "To allow damages ... suffered in consequence of
[a] conviction would in tendency make it profitable to violate
the law, and oppose the principle of denying any redress for a
violation of law."334  Thus, the appellate court ruled that
despite the Port District attorney's advice, common sense
should have told the board member not to engage in self-
dealing, and the board member could not maintain a legal
malpractice action against the attorney and the Port
District.335
While a malpractice action was not available for the
criminal defendant in Chapman, a defense attorney's
defective representation caused one appellate court to reverse
a defendant's criminal conviction. The Second District Court
of Appeal determined that a criminal defendant was
necessarily prejudiced by his defense attorney's failure to
complete an adequate pretrial factual investigation, and was
therefore entitled to a new trial. 36 In In re Rocha, the
defendant was charged with murder and premeditated
attempted murder following a shooting match that occurred
at a party that mostly high school students attended.337 After
the convictions were affirmed on appeal, the defendant filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective
assistance of his trial counsel. 38
After examining the mixed questions of law and fact,339
the appellate court granted the petition on the grounds that
"the deficient performance trial counsel rendered in
conducting his pretrial investigation necessarily was
prejudicial to petition and thus requires a new trial."340
332. Id. at 862 (analogizing to Saks v. Sawtelle, 880 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.
1994)).
333. Chapman, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862-63.
334. Id. at 862 (quoting Saks, 880 S.W.2d at 470).
335. Chapman, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863-64.
336. In re Rocha, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 345 (Ct. App. 2005) (depublished).
337. Id. at 347.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 348.
340. Id. at 352.
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Although "the failure to find some of [the potential witnesses]
generally constitutes incompetence only when counsel has
refused to investigate leads that potentially would beneficial
to the defendant . . trial counsel's approach to the
investigation was so deficient that it was tantamount to a
refusal to investigate. ' 34' Trial counsel knew that there
would be extra work in locating and convincing witnesses to
talk to him because many were high school students, and he
neglected to begin his investigation until five months after he
began representation and five weeks before the trial date. 42
Furthermore, he failed to properly utilize an investigator he
hired.343 Trial counsel did not meet with his predecessor, or
his predecessor's investigators, and did not follow up on a
note in the case file indicating that one person was an
"'essential' witness for the defense."344 Three weeks before
the rescheduled trial date, trial counsel admitted that his
investigation of the potential witnesses was incomplete. 45
Finally, trial counsel could only produce timesheets
indicating that he had worked eight and half hours on
petitioner's case and that his investigator worked only
thirteen hours in six days.346 In light of these facts, the court
determined that "this is such an extreme defalcation of the
duty to conduct a timely and reasonable factual investigation
of the case as to constitute a breakdown in the adversarial
process,"  and that the petitioner must be granted a new
trial. 4s
X. MISCONDUCT IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
In 2005, the California Supreme Court issued twenty-
nine death penalty opinions, 349 two of which were on habeas
341. Id. at 349.
342. Rocha, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 350.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 351.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Rocha, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 352.
349. People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th 1149 (2005); In re Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th
40 (2005); People v. Benavides, 35 Cal. 4th 69 (2005); In re Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th
140 (2005); In re Tauno Waidla, 35 Cal. 4th 140 (2005); People v. Harrison, 35
Cal. 4th 208 (2005); People v. Vieira, 35 Cal. 4th 264 (2005); People v. Smith, 35
Cal. 4th 334 (2005); People v. Panah, 35 Cal. 4th 395 (2005); People v. Stitely,
35 Cal. 4th 514 (2005); People v. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th 646 (2005); People v.
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corpus petitions350 and the rest of which were on automatic
appeal.3 51 The supreme court reversed the lower court in only
three of those cases. 52 However, in one of the reversals, the
majority reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct. 3  In
another reversed decision, Justice Joyce Kennard would have
reversed the defendant's death sentence for prosecutorial
misconduct reasons, while the majority reversed a life
sentence on other grounds but affirmed the death sentence. 54
In the remaining cases that were affirmed on appeal, the
court found that either there was no misconduct, the
defendant had waived the misconduct by failing to object at
the trial level, or the misconduct was harmless. 5
Dickey, 35 Cal. 4th 884 (2005); People v. Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th 96 (2005); People
v. Ward, 36 Cal. 4th 186 (2005); People v. Wilson, 36 Cal. 4th 309 (2005); People
v. Davis, 36 Cal. 4th 510 (2005); People v. Kennedy, 36 Cal. 4th 595 (2005);
People v. Blair, 36 Cal. 4th 686 (2005); People v. Dunkle, 36 Cal. 4th 861 (2005);
People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1114 (2005); People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1215
(2005); People v. Moon, 37 Cal. 4th 1 (2005); People v. Cornwell, 37 Cal. 4th 50
(2005); People v. Gray, 37 Cal. 4th 168 (2005); People v. Schmeck, 37 Cal. 4th
240 (2005); People v. Harris, 37 Cal. 4th 310 (2005); People v. Elliot, 37 Cal. 4th
453 (2005); People v. Manriquez, 37 Cal. 4th 547 (2005); People v. Robinson, 37
Cal. 4th 592 (2005).
350. Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40; Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th 140.
351. Young, 34 Cal. 4th 1149; Benavides, 35 Cal. 4th 69; Harrison, 35 Cal.
4th 208; Vieira, 35 Cal. 4th 264; Smith, 35 Cal. 4th 334; Panah, 35 Cal. 4th 395;
Stitely, 35 Cal. 4th 514; Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th 646; Dickey, 35 Cal. 4th 884;
Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th 96; Ward, 36 Cal. 4th 186; Wilson, 36 Cal. 4th 309; Davis,
36 Cal. 4th 510; Kennedy, 36 Cal. 4th 595; Blair, 36 Cal. 4th 686; Dunkle, 36
Cal. 4th 861; Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1114; Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1215; Moon, 37 Cal.
4th 1; Cornwell, 37 Cal. 4th 50; Gray, 37 Cal. 4th 168; Schmeck, 37 Cal. 4th 240;
Harris, 37 Cal. 4th 310; Elliot, 37 Cal. 4th 453; Manriquez, 37 Cal. 4th 547;
Robinson, 37 Cal. 4th 592.
352. Hawthorne, 35 Cal. 4th 40 (reversed because of mental disability issues);
Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th 140; Vieira, 35 Cal. 4th 264.
353. Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th 140.
354. Vieira, 35 Cal. 4th at 305.
355. See, e.g., Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 741. One example of the court finding
misconduct but ruling it was harmless appeared in People v. Young, in which
the court said, "We agree to the extent the prosecutor characterized defense
counsel as 'liars' or accused counsel of lying to the jury, the prosecutor's
remarks constituted misconduct." Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1193. In another
instance, the court found misconduct in a prosecutor's remark during closing
argument that "defendant's continued claim of innocence during the penalty
phase could be considered as an aggravating factor in determining the penalty."
Kennedy, 36 Cal. 4th at 635. However, the court found that the defendant failed
to object, thereby forfeiting the claim, and it nevertheless found that the error
was not prejudicial. Id. at 636.
996 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 46
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct 356
Of prosecutorial misconduct, judicial misconduct, and
ineffective assistance of defense counsel, defendants most
often claimed prosecutorial misconduct.5 7  Defendants
alleged prosecutorial misconduct in twenty of the death
penalty cases decided in 2005.358 Defendants alleged
prosecutorial misconduct in the guilt phase of the trial in
eighteen cases, 359 and in the penalty phase of the trial in
fourteen cases. °  In twelve cases, defendants claimed
prosecutorial misconduct in both the penalty and guilt phases
356. As used in this piece, prosecutorial misconduct includes the following:
(1) Griffin error, where the prosecutor argues that evidence is un-contradicted
when the evidence could only be contradicted by the defendant's own testimony,
and the defendant has exercised his or her right not to testify, see, e.g.,
Harrison, 35 Cal. 4th at 257-58; (2) Davenport error, in which the prosecutor
improperly argues that the lack of mitigating factors in the penalty phase
constitutes an aggravating factor, see, e.g., id. at 259-60; (3) Caldwell error,
where the prosecutor argues that the responsibility for determining whether the
death sentence is appropriate rests with someone besides the jury, see, e.g.,
Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th at 134-35.
357. See infra Part X.A. Claims of juror misconduct and spectator
misconduct were not included in the tally.
358. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1184-98, 1218-24; People v. Benavides, 35 Cal. 4th
69, 107-08 (2005); Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th at 151-67; Harrison, 35 Cal. 4th at 240-
249, 256-60; Vieira, 35 Cal. 4th at 294-97; People v. Smith, 35 Cal. 4th 334, 359-
60, 372 (2005); People v. Panah, 35 Cal. 4th 395, 454-64, 496-97 (2005); People
v. Stitely, 35 Cal. 4th 514, 557-60, 567-72 (2005); Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 719-21,
741-44; Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th at 124-26, 128-29, 133-35; People v. Ward, 36 Cal.
4th 186, 215-16 (2005); People v. Wilson, 36 Cal. 4th 309, 332-39, 358-60 (2005);
Kennedy, 36 Cal. 4th at 617-27, 629-36; People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1114,
1203-05 (2005); People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1215, 1263-68, 1277 (2005); People
v. Moon, 37 Cal. 4th 1, 16-19 (2005); People v. Cornwell, 37 Cal. 4th 50, 91-93
(2005); People v. Gray, 37 Cal. 4th 168, 214-18 (2005); People v. Schmeck, 37
Cal. 4th 240, 263-65, 285-90, 298-301 (2005); People v. Harris, 37 Cal. 4th 310,
341-46 (2005).
359. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1184-98; Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th at 151-67;
Harrison, 35 Cal. 4th at 240-249; Smith, 35 Cal. 4th at 359-60; Panah, 35 Cal.
4th at 454-64; Stitely, 35 Cal. 4th at 557-60; Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 719-21;
Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th at 124-26, 128-29; Ward, 36 Cal. 4th at 215-16; Wilson, 36
Cal. 4th at 332-39; Kennedy, 36 Cal. 4th at 617-27; People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th
1114, 1203-05 (2005); People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1215, 1263-68 (2005); Moon,
37 Cal. 4th at 16-19; Cornwell, 37 Cal. 4th at 91-93; Gray, 37 Cal. 4th at 214-
218; Schmeck, 37 Cal. 4th at 263-65, 285-90; Harris, 37 Cal. 4th at 341-46.
360. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1218-1224; Benavides, 35 Cal. 4th at 107-08;
Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th at 151-67; Harrison, 35 Cal. 4th at 256-60; Vieira, 35 Cal.
4th at 294-97; Smith, 35 Cal. 4th at 372; Panah, 35 Cal. 4th at 496-97; Stitely,
35 Cal. 4th at 567-72; Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 741-44; Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th at
133-35; Wilson, 36 Cal. 4th at 358-60; Kennedy, 36 Cal. 4th at 629-36; People v.
Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1215, 1277 (2005); Schmeck, 37 Cal. 4th at 298-310.
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of the trial. 6'
As indicated above, prosecutorial misconduct drew the
attention of the justices in two of the cases that were
reversed,362 though it drew the attention of only a dissenting
judge in one of those cases.363 In the first case, a 6-1 decision,
the California Supreme Court granted a habeas corpus
petition to a death row inmate due to the inconsistent
arguments of a prosecutor that deprived the defendant of due
process of law. 64  In In re Sakarias, defendants Peter
Sakarias and Tauno Waidla were convicted of the same
murder in separate trials, and juries sentenced each to
death.365  The prosecutor's argument at each trial was that
the defendant personally dealt three blows to the victim with
a hatchet, the first of which resulted in the victim's death. 66
However, the evidence showed that the first fatal blow could
only have been inflicted by a single person,367 that Waidla
delivered that first blow, and that Sakarias delivered two
postmortem or perimortem blows after the victim received
abrasions from being dragged to a bedroom. Indeed, to
argue that Sakarias had inflicted the first fatal blow, the
prosecutor had to avoid eliciting testimony about the
postmortem abrasions from an expert, previously elicited in
Waidla's trial, that revealed that the only blows Sakarias
dealt came after the victim's death.3 6 9  The prosecutor
submitted as evidence the same photographs at each of the
trials, with the exception of the abrasion photograph at
Sakarias's trial, to deliberately avoid presenting evidence
"'inconvenient' to his new and different theory of the
361. Young, 34 Cal. 4th at 1184-98, 1218-1224; Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th at 151-
67; Harrison, 35 Cal. 4th at 240-49, 256-60; Smith, 35 Cal. 4th at 359-60, 372;
Panah, 35 Cal. 4th at 454-64, 496-97; Stitely, 35 Cal. 4th at 557-60, 567-72;
Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 719-21, 741-44; Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th at 124-26, 128-29,
133-35; Wilson, 36 Cal. 4th at 332-39, 358-60; Kennedy, 36 Cal. 4th at 617-27,
629-36; People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1215, 1263-68, 1277 (2005); Schmeck, 37
Cal. 4th at 263-65, 285-90, 298-310.
362. Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th 140; Vieira, 35 Cal. 4th 264.
363. Vieira, 35 Cal. 4th at 305.
364. Sakarias, 35 Cal. 4th at 144.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 147-48.
367. Id. at 145.
368. Id. at 147.
369. Id. at 148.
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attack. 370
Although the court found that such misconduct was
harmless in the case of Waidla because the evidence
supported the fact that he delivered the antemortum blow
that resulted in the victim's death,371 it granted Sakarias
relief because "the prosecutor violated his due process rights
by intentionally and without good faith justification arguing
inconsistent and irreconcilable factual theories in the two
trials. '372 The court held that "fundamental fairness does not
permit the People, without good faith justification, to
attribute to two defendants, in separate trials, a criminal act
only one defendant could have committed."3
73
Only Justice Marvin Baxter dissented, arguing that
neither Sakarias nor the other defendant should have been
granted relief3 7 4 Justice Baxter did not find any bad faith in
the prosecutor's conduct, and he thought that the People
could properly rely on the defense to expose gaps such as the
one in this case.375 When there is uncertain evidence and the
prosecution did not introduce false evidence, Justice Baxter
would leave decisions about which case against each
defendant was stronger to the prosecution and would not
"second-guess the prosecution's strategy."376 However, he did
leave open the possibility that he would find prosecutorial
misconduct in the use of irreconcilable theories in a case with
different facts.377
In the second reversed decision in which the defendant
claimed prosecutorial misconduct, a prosecutor's biblical
argument caused Justice Kennard to dissent and require
reversal of the death sentence. 8  In People v. Vieira, the
prosecutor made religious and Biblical references during the
penalty phase of trial.3 7 9 As cited in both the majority and the
dissenting opinions, the prosecutor said,
370. Sakarais, 35 Cal. 4th at 153.
371. Id. at 167.
372. Id. at 145.
373. Id. at 156.
374. Id. at 171.
375. Id. at 172.
376. Sakarais, 35 Cal. 4th at 177.
377. Id. at 179.
378. People v. Vieira, 35 Cal. 4th 264, 305 (2005). The majority reversed this
case on other grounds. Id. at 305.
379. Id. at 308.
998 [Vol: 46
ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
People from time to time have a problem because they say,
"Gee, in the Bible it says, 'Thou shall not kill,' and
'Vengeance is mine sayeth the Lord. I will repay.'" That's
found in Romans. But the in the very next passage... it
goes on and calls for capital punishment and says, "[tihe
ruler bears not the sword in vain for he is the minister of
God, a revenger or to execute wrath upon him that doeth
evil." He's talking about the ruler, the government,
whatever.
Now, the Judeo-Christian ethic comes from the Old
Testament I believe the first five books called the Torah in
the Jewish religion. And there are two very important
concepts that are found there. And that's, one, capital
punishment for murder is necessary in order to preserve
the sanctity of human life, and two, only the severest
penalty of death can underscore the severity of taking life.
The really interesting passage is in Exodus, chapter 21,
verses 12 to 14: 'Vhoever strikes another man and kills
him shall be put to death. But if he did not act with intent
but they met by act of God, the slayer may flee to a place
which I will appoint for you." Kind of like life without
possibility of parole, haven, sanctuary. "But if a man has
the presumption to kill another by treachery, you shall
take him even from my alter to be put to death." There is
no sanctuary for the intentional killer, according to the
Bible.
Now, I'll leave it at that. That was just in the event any of
you have any reservations about religion in this case.
380
Prosecutors commit misconduct when they make
improper religious or biblical references.3 8 1 As the court has
stated, "The primary vice in referring to the Bible and other
religious authority is that such argument may diminish the
jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and ... imply that
another, higher law should be applied in capital cases,
displacing the law in the court's instructions."382
Furthermore,
[w]hen prosecutors invoke religious rhetoric, or when they
380. Id.
381. People v. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th 646, 743 (2005). "We cannot emphasize too
strongly that to ask the jury to consider biblical teachings when deliberating is
patent misconduct." People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 692 n.6 (1998).
382. People v. Hughes, 27 Cal. 4th 287, 389 (2002).
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argue based on what they take to be the true meaning of
scriptural passages, all to convince a jury to impose the
death penalty, they create and encourage an intolerable
risk that the jury will abandon logic and reason and
instead condemn an offender for reasons having no place
in our judicial system.38 3
Both the majority and the dissent in Vieira found the
above-quoted argument improper. 4 However, the court
disagreed on whether the misconduct required reversal of the
defendant's death sentence.8
The majority concluded that the defendant waived his
right to appeal because his counsel failed to object, and it
found that although the argument constituted misconduct, it
was not prejudicial. 6 The court reasoned that the argument
"was only a small part of a prosecutorial argument that
primarily focused on explaining to the jury the mitigating
factors."38 7 Justice Kennard dissented because she found the
biblical argument to be prejudicial to the defendant because
"without the prosecutor's improper biblical argument, the
jury would not have returned a verdict of death."38
Beyond Vieira, prosecutors' religious and biblical
arguments have created a divided court. 9 In People v.
Harrison, Justice Carlos Moreno disagreed with the
383. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 743. Another problem with prosecutors arguing
that the Bible or religion calls for capital punishment is that those arguments
may distort what the religious authorities actually say about retribution. As
the California Supreme Court said, "[A]lthough such matters of theology are, of
course, well beyond our purview, we observe some scholars have suggested
reliance on the lex talionis [the ancient law of retributive justice] in this context
may oversimplify the meaning of the pertinent scriptural passages." Hill, 17
Cal. 4th at 836 n.6.
384. See Vieira, 35 Cal. 4th at 297, 310.
385. See id.
386. Id. at 297.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 310 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
389. One other case in 2005 dealt with a defendant's claim that the
prosecutor committed misconduct by referencing the Bible. In People v. Roldan,
the court unanimously held that the defendant forfeited his right to appeal on
that issue because his counsel failed to object, and that the prosecutor's
argument did not render the trial so unfair as to cause the court to address the
issue regardless of the lack of objection. People v. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th 646, 743
(2005). The court did, however, explicitly mention that prosecutors' use of
arguments, such as that the Bible requires the death penalty, constitutes
"patent misconduct." Id. (quoting People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800, 836 n.6
(1998)).
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majority's conclusion that a prosecutor's religious and biblical
references in the guilt phase of the trial did not constitute
misconduct. 90  Justice Moreno, accompanied by Justice
Kathryn Werdegar, found fault with "the prosecutor's
extended metaphor invoking the Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse (see Revelation 6:1-6:8), his description of
defendant as 'the disciple of Satan,' and his charge to the jury
to 'take the sword from [defendant] and cast it down and tell
him that he was wrong and may go no further.' 391  The
majority explained that a prosecutor's biblical argument at
the guilt phase of the trial is just as improper as at the
penalty phase, though for a different reason.3 92 At the guilt
phase, such arguments are improper because they have no
place in the process of deciding questions of historical fact
and applying those facts to the law.393  Nonetheless, the
majority found that not all biblical references are improper,
and that the above argument did not constitute misconduct
because it amounted to merely literary allusion and "a
powerfully dramatic illustration of the gravity and enormity
of defendant's crimes."394 Justice Moreno, however, found
that the prosecutor's argument "crossed the line between
permissible allusion to the Bible and impermissible religious
exhortation," particularly because it suggested to the jury
that it should use Biblical rather than California law to
decide the case.395
A prosecutor's biblical argument created a similar schism
in the court in People v. Samuels. In Samuels, during a small
portion of her penalty phase argument, the prosecutor
referenced passages of the Bible. 96 The prosecutor followed
the biblical references with a clear statement that the jurors
were not to supplant California law with biblical law, and
that the reference was merely to assuage concerns jurors may
have that the Bible forbids capital punishment. 97  The
390. People v. Harrison, 35 Cal. 4th 208, 261 (2005). Justice Moreno,
however, concurred in the judgment of death because he found that the
argument was not prejudicial. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 247.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 248.
395. Id. at 262-63 (Moreno, J., concurring).
396. People v. Samuels, 36 Cal. 4th 96, 144-45 (2005).
397. Id. at 145.
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majority found that, even if the argument was error, it was
harmless because it constituted only a small part of her
overall argument. 9 Although Justice Kennard determined
that the argument was not improper because it indicated that
jurors should not be swayed by biblical or religious
teachings,399 she disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
a prosecutor's improper religious argument would be
harmless if it was only a small part of the overall
argument.40 0  Instead, Justice Kennard said "an
impermissible reliance on religious authority by the
prosecutor may be prejudicial even when, as here, the biblical
references are only a short part of the prosecutor's
argument."4 1  Thus, the court in 2005 was divided on
whether a prosecutor's biblical argument in either the guilt or
penalty phase of the trial constituted misconduct and
whether it was prejudicial.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel402
Defendants claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in
seven cases. 40 3 Defendants claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel in the guilt phase in six of cases,404 while only two
claimed it in the penalty phase,40 5 and only one claimed it in
both the penalty and guilt phases.4 6  One interesting
ineffective assistance of counsel claim arose in People v.
Carter. In Carter, the California Supreme Court ruled that
398. Id. at 134.
399. Id. at 147.
400. Id. at 146 (Kennard, J., dissenting in part).
401. Id.
402. Ineffective assistance of counsel as used in the piece includes Marsden
motions, in which defendants seek to replace their counsel because they think
their counsel is ineffective. See, e.g., People v. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th 646, 681
(2005).
403. People v. Panah, 35 Cal. 4th 395, 427-32 (2005); Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at
671-83, 726-28; People v. Blair, 36 Cal. 4th 686, 720-29 (2005); People v.
Dunkle, 36 Cal. 4th 861, 913-18 (2005); People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1114, 1137-
39, 1188-1200 (2005) (includes ineffective assistance of counsel at the
preliminary hearing stage); People v. Cornwell, 37 Cal. 4th 50, 74-78, 98-102
(2005) (includes ineffective assistance of counsel at the motion for new trial);
People v. Gray, 37 Cal. 4th 168, 205-214 (2005).
404. Panah, 35 Cal. 4th at 427-32; Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 671-83; Blair, 36
Cal. 4th at 720-29; People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1114, 1188-1200 (2005);
Cornwell, 37 Cal. 4th at 74-78; Gray, 37 Cal. 4th at 205-214.
405. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 726-28; Dunkle, 36 Cal. 4th at 913-18.
406. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 671-83, 726-28.
1002 [Vol: 46
ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW
defendant's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance
of counsel even though his counsel failed to make an opening
statement, present any evidence on defendant's behalf, or
make any substantive closing argument regarding the
prosecution's failure to reach its burden of proof.40 The court
concluded that since the record on appeal failed to illuminate
why defense counsel failed to present a defense, defendant's
claim must fail, especially because trial counsel's decisions
were likely tactical.0 For example,
reasonably competent counsel . . . could have determined
that in view of the strong evidence linking defendant to
the murders, a guilty verdict was virtually a foregone
conclusion, and that defendant's prospects of avoiding the
death penalty would be improved if the defense refrained
from placing its "credibility" at risk by suggesting an
implausible defense. 409
The only insight the record disclosed for the trial
counsel's failure to present a defense at the guilt phase
indicated that the decision was tactical, "influenced by the
relative strengths and weaknesses of a decision to present a
defense, as well as by the pendency of the murder charges
against defendant in other counties."410
The defendant also claimed that his counsel improperly
injected his failure to testify into the proceedings, thereby
allowing the jury to draw inferences of guilt.411 The court,
however, refused to extend to defense attorneys the rule
forbidding prosecutors from inviting adverse inferences from
a defendant's failure to testify.412 Likewise, the court rejected
defendant's assertion that he was denied the opportunity to
present a defense and to effective representation because of a
conflict with his counsel. 13  Defense counsel thought it
tactically appropriate not to present a defense, but defendant
claimed he wanted to testify.41 4 The court found that the trial
court did not have to relieve defendant's counsel, 415 and that
407. People v. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th 1114, 1188 (2005).
408. Id. at 1190.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 1191-92.
413. Carter, 36 Cal. 4th at 1197.
414. Id. at 1198.
415. Id. at 1197.
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defendant could have asserted his right to testify, even if his
counsel did not present any other witnesses.416
A conflict of interest that a defendant himself created
also gave rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In People v. Roldan, the defendant made numerous and
varied claims against his defense counsel. 417 Defense counsel
requested that the defendant be examined by a mental health
expert because he doubted the defendant's competence.418
The trial court granted the request, and Dr. Michael Maloney,
a clinical psychologist, examined the defendant. 419 During the
course of his interviews, the defendant said that he planned
to kill the prosecutor.42 ° After the prosecution refused to plea
bargain and indicated its decision to seek the death penalty,
defense counsel made a motion for a continuance.421' At the
hearing, defense counsel explained that he had attempted to
speak with the defendant fourteen or fifteen times, that the
defendant refused to speak with him, and that the
defendant's family members were not helpful in getting the
defendant to speak with his attorney. 422 The defense attorney
also revealed that Dr. Maloney had warned him about threats
the defendant had made against the defense attorney, and
that he had taken precautions to protect his family.423
Defense counsel urged the court to grant the continuance so
that he could try "to repair his relationship with
defendant, 424 explaining that the defendant's threat to his
life was "going to play on [his] mind night and day," and that
he could not objectively represent his client at that
moment.425 The court denied the motion for continuance,
indicating that it believed the defendant was "trying to
manufacture a possible delay."426  Defense counsel later
declared a conflict of interest twice, once before trial, and once
during the guilt phase of the trial when defendant again
416. Id. at 1199.
417. People v. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th 646, 671-77 (2005).
418. Id. at 667.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 668.
422. Id.
423. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 668.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 669.
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threatened his life to another mental health expert. 27 Each
time, the trial court denied the motion indicating again its
belief that the defendant was trying to delay or inject error
into the trial, and that defense counsel was "doing an
exemplary job."4 2' At the penalty phase of the trial, the trial
court ruled that Dr. Maloney could testify that the defendant
"had said he wanted to hurt the prosecutor; specifically, he
mentioned gouging the prosecutor's eyes out."42 9 To mitigate
the effect of this statement, the trial court allowed defense
counsel to testify that defendant's "extremely depressed and
angry" mental state at the time he learned that the
prosecution refused to plea bargain explained his outrageous
comments and that he did not actually intend to harm the
prosecutor.430
The defendant first claimed that the trial court
inappropriately denied defense counsel's motion to withdraw
thereby denying the defendant his federal and state
constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel."
Although to assure effective assistance of counsel, a trial
court cannot deny a defendant and his attorney the
reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial,4 32 "it is settled law
... that the denial of a request for a continuance, which such
request is premised on an accused's persistent failure to
cooperate with counsel and his deliberate refusal to assist
counsel, is not arbitrary."43 3 Therefore, the supreme court
concluded that the denial of the continuance was within the
trial court's discretion and did not violate the defendant's
constitutional rights.434
Second, the defendant claimed that his attorney labored
under a conflict of interest because he feared for his life due
to the defendant's threats.435  The defendant argued that
"counsel acted to ensure his personal safety and thereby
deprived defendant of the undivided loyalty a criminal
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 722.
430. Id. at 725.
431. Id. at 666.
432. Id. at 670.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 671.
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defendant should expect from his legal representative."436
The court rejected this argument noting that "tihere is
something perverse in this argument, for ... defendant's own
behavior created the alleged conflict and threatened to
undermine his lawyer's effectiveness."437 The court indicated
that it was "reluctant to recognize a rule of law that would
empower criminal defendants to inject reversible error into
their trials simply by threatening their lawyers."438 Although
the court said "no rigid rule exists to preclude relief whenever
a claimed conflict of interest with counsel originates in a
defendant's own actions,""3  the court found that the
circumstances here posed neither a potential nor actual
conflict of interest.44 °
Third, the defendant appealed the trial court's denial of
its three Marsden motions." 1  A defendant can make a
Marsden motion at any time during trial "to discharge his
appointed counsel and substitute another attorney," and he
"is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first
appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation
or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such
an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is
likely to result.""2 The court found no abuse of discretion in
the trial court's denial because defense counsel was providing
effective assistance, and the conflict, which the defendant
created, did not substantially impair his right to effective
assistance of counsel." 3
Fourth, the defendant claimed the trial court erred in
allowing Dr. Maloney to testify as to what he said about
harming the prosecutor because it was protected under the
attorney-client privilege.444 The court reasoned that since Dr.
Maloney was a defense expert, the privilege extended to the
defendant's communications with him and should not have
been disclosed. 445  Although the court found merit in the
436. Id. at 674.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 675.
440. Id.
441. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 677.
442. Id. at 681.
443. Id. at 681-82.
444. Id. at 723.
445. Id. at 724.
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defendant's claim, it determined that the error was
harmless.446
Fifth, the defendant claimed that his counsel had a
second conflict of interest because his attorney testified at
trial as to the circumstances surrounding his threats
regarding the prosecutor.447  The court found that the
defendant could not claim a conflict because the conflict was
explained to him by an independent attorney, and the
defendant expressly waived the conflict in open court."8
In another case, a defense counsel's failure to object at
trial spurred a concurring opinion regarding a work product
privilege issue that the supreme court may one day revisit.
In People v. Gray, the defendant claimed that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object
based on the work product privilege to the prosecutor's
comment that the failure of defense experts who had access to
the evidence to testify meant that the defense experts'
testimony would have corroborated the prosecution experts'
testimony."9 The majority did not resolve the issue because
it found that defense counsel's failure to object was not
prejudicial.5 °  Justice Chin, joined by Justice Baxter,
indicated his concern with the ruling in People v.
Coddington,45' which "suggested that the work product
privilege .. .would preclude a prosecutor from even arguing
that the defendant's failure to call defense experts who had
examined forensic evidence at the crime scene logically
indicated they had nothing helpful to contribute."452 Justice
Chin "wonder[ed] whether [Coddington's] work product
analysis was flawed, being directly inconsistent with the
general rule that the prosecutor may comment on the
defense's failure to call a retained expert or other logical
witness to rebut the People's case. 45 3  Thus, Justice Chin
indicated his willingness to disapprove Coddington on this
point.454
446. Id. at 725.
447. Roldan, 35 Cal. 4th at 726.
448. Id. at 727-28.
449. People v. Gray, 37 Cal. 4th 168, 207-09 (2005).
450. Id. at 208.
451. People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081 (Cal. 2000).
452. Gray, 37 Cal. 4th at 238.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 239.
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C. Judicial Misconduct
Defendants claimed judicial misconduct, particularly
judicial bias, in the guilt phase, in three cases.455 In People v.
Harris, the court dealt with a defendant's claim of judicial
bias. 456  The defendant claimed the following instances of
judicial bias: "[the court's] direct statements of disbelief in
defendant's case; interjecting its own objection during cross-
examination of a police officer . . . ; [making] disparaging
remarks to defense counsel during cross-examination of the
evidence technician; interjecting its own objection during
cross-examination of the fingerprint technician . . . ; and
conduct[ing] its own cross-examination of defendant."457 The
majority found that there was no evidence of judicial bias
against the defendant. 458 The majority determined that the
court only commented on the evidence outside the presence of
the jury,45 9 curbed vague questions to maintain "reasonable
control of the trial to avoid irrelevant or unduly prolonged
testimony,"46 ° challenged questions posed by both sides,461 and
curbed repetitious questioning within its discretion to
expedite examination. 462 Although the majority found some of
the court's questioning of the defendant "inappropriate," it
found no prejudice.463
Justice Kennard, however, found that there was judicial
bias in the way the court questioned defendant, although she
found the bias to be harmless.464 Justice Kennard pointed to
questions that did nothing to clarify the evidence, made
defendant repeat information that would be damaging to the
defense, or were argumentative or repetitive.465  Justice
Kennard determined that "certain of the court's questions
may well have conveyed to the jury the judge's opinion that
defendant's testimony was not credible. In doing so, the judge
455. People v. Panah, 35 Cal. 4th 395, 450-53 (2005); People v. Samuels, 36
Cal. 4th 96, 114-120 (2005); People v. Harris, 37 Cal. 4th 310, 346-51 (2005).
456. Harris, 37 Cal. 4th at 346-51.
457. Id. at 346.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 347.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 348.
462. Harris, 37 Cal. 4th at 348.
463. Id. at 350.
464. Id. at 367 (Kennard, J., dissenting on other grounds).
465. Id. at 371.
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became an advocate for the prosecution, abandoning the
neutrality required of a judge."466
XI. DISBARMENT
The California Supreme Court rarely issues opinions on
attorney discipline largely because of its usual deference to
the Review Department of the State Bar Court, though it still
has ultimate jurisdiction over such matters.467 The supreme
court did, however, issue one full-length opinion in 2005.468
Ronald Robert Silverton was disbarred in 1975 for "his felony
convictions for conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses
and to present a fraudulent insurance claim as well as for
soliciting another to commit or join in the commission of
grand theft."469 Then, after unsuccessfully re-applying to the
bar three times, Silverton was re-admitted in 1992.470 Less
than two years later, Silverton began a fee scheme that
created the basis for the present disciplinary action. 1
Silverton, a personal injury attorney, after winning or
settling a case, would routinely offer to clients immediate
payment (usually rounding their recovery up to the nearest
thousand) in exchange for the right to negotiate their medical
bills and to retain the savings he obtained.472 Silverton
generally did not disclose all of the information about the
agreement, did not advise his clients of their right to seek
independent legal advice, and could not show that the
agreement was fair and reasonable as required by
Professional Conduct Rule 3-300 governing business
transactions. 3 As a result, the Review Department found
that Silverton had committed violations of Rules 3-300 and 4-
200 prohibiting unconscionable fees.474 It also found three
uncharged violations of Rule 3-300, and three uncharged
violations of Rule 4-100 for giving clients their settlement
checks before the settlement was deposited in the client trust
466. Id. at 367.
467. In re Ronald Robert Silverton, 113 P.3d 556, 561 (Cal. 2005).
468. Silverton, 113 P.3d 556.
469. Id. at 557.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 557-561.
473. Id. at 557-61.
474. Silverton, 113 P.3d at 559, 560.
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account.475
The Review Department recommended a stayed two-year
suspension, an actual sixty-day suspension, and three years
probation.476 In so doing, the Review Board declined to apply
Standard for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct
1.7(a),477 which provides that
[i]f a member is found culpable of professional misconduct
in any proceeding in which discipline may be imposed and
the member has a record of one prior imposition of
discipline . . . , the degree of discipline shall be greater
than that imposed in the prior proceeding unless the prior
discipline imposed was so remote in time to the current
proceeding and the offense for which it was imposed was
so minimal in severity that imposing greater discipline
would be manifestly unjust. 478
The supreme court denied Silverton's petition for review,
but granted review on its own motion, "indicat[ing]
reservations about the level of discipline that the Review
Department intended to impose."479 The court found that the
Review Department failed to apply the two portions of the
exception and improperly applied the first part of the
exception for remoteness.480  Contrary to the Review
Department, the court found that "although 19 years elapsed
between Silverton's disbarment and his new misconduct, he
was ineligible to practice law for all but 22 months of that
period. We therefore give little weight to the remoteness of
the prior discipline."481 Applying the second part of the
exception, the court found that Silverton's previous offenses
were quite severe, and therefore the exception to Standard
1.7(a) did not apply.482
Finally, considering the purposes of sanctioning
attorneys, and since the standards are not binding and the
Review Department imposed a lesser sanction, the court held
that
when an attorney has previously been disbarred,
475. Id. at 561.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 562.
478. STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY SANCTIONS FOR PROF'L MISCONDUCT 1.7(a).
479. Silverton, 113 P.3d at 557, 561.
480. Id. at 562.
481. Id.
482. Id.
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disbarment is the appropriate sanction for subsequent
professional misconduct unless the exception set forth in
standard 1.7(a) is satisfied or the attorney can otherwise
establish "grave doubts as to the propriety" of disbarment
in the particular case. In this context, the burden should
be on the attorney to demonstrate the existence of
extraordinary circumstances justifying a less sanction.48 3
The court then concluded that Silverton had not met his
burden, partially because he refused to acknowledge any
wrongdoing in either of his disbarment proceedings. 484 As a
result, the court ruled to disbar Silverton again.48 5
XII. CONCLUSION
The year in ethics in 2005 included opinions from the
California Supreme Court, the California Courts of Appeal,
and the State Bar regarding attorney fees and related
issues, 486 conflict of interest, 7 the attorney-client privilege,488
confidentiality,4 9  missed deadlines, 490  entering into
stipulations,491  and legal malpractice and ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.492  Notably, in addressing
misconduct in death penalty cases, the California Supreme
Court faced a schism regarding prosecutor's religious and
biblical arguments.493 These claims will likely continue to fill
the court's opinions, and it will be interesting to see how the
new justice, Justice Carol Corrigan, who replaced Justice
Janice Rogers Brown, will influence the debate.494  Also
noteworthy was the court's rarely issued full opinion ordering
disbarment of an attorney.495 Government attorneys should
483. Id. at 562-63 (quoting Lawhorn v. State Bar, 743 P.2d 908, 912 (Cal.
1987)).
484. Silverton, 113 P.3d at 564-65.
485. Id. at 565.
486. See supra Part II.
487. See supra Part III.
488. See supra Part IV.
489. See supra Part V.
490. See supra Part VII.
491. See supra Part VIII.
492. See supra Part IX.
493. See supra Part X.A.
494. Justice Carol A. Corrigan was confirmed to the California Supreme
Court on January 4, 2006. Courts: Supreme Court: Justices,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/justices.htm (last visited Sept. 8,
2006).
495. See supra Part XI.
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also monitor the legislative rumblings about an exception to
the duty of confidentiality for government whistleblowers,
which resurfaced in 2005.496
As attorneys and others continue to grapple with new
ethics issues and opinions each year, they should remember
that the Commission for the Revision of the Rules of
Professional Conduct is in the process of revising the rules.497
The Commission does not expect to have the rules completed
and submitted to the State Bar Board of Governors for
adoption and the California Supreme Court for approval
before 2008.498 However, the Commission will circulate its
proposed rules for public comment beginning in 2006. 499 This
is an opportunity for attorneys to voice their concerns and
ideas about the laws and rules that govern their profession.
496. See supra Part VI.
497. E-mail from Harry Sondheim, Chair of the Commission for the Revision
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, to Pamela Glazner, author (Apr. 24, 2006,
17:40:04 PST) (on file with author).
498. Id.
499. Id.
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